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Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a crisis in global democracy. The rise of 
nationalist, far-right parties and governments have swept Europe into a new tide of 
illiberalism. In Western Europe, the drift towards the nationalist right has taken shape in 
the success and notoriety of politicians like Marine Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders 
in the Netherlands. Even the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union indicates 
the far-reaching trend of conservative nationalism. In Eastern Europe, a number of the 
formerly communist Member States have become hotbeds of illiberalism within the 
European Union, where illiberal parties and policies are deeply integrated into state 
structures.  
The illiberal grip on Eastern European Member States creates political friction in 
the dynamics between the EU and its Members. The European Union has been lauded for 
its effective spread of liberal democracy and its inclusion of civil protections and liberal 
principles in its laws. However, the illiberalism sweeping through Europe presents an 
existential question about the European Union’s authority and ability to maintain liberal 
democracy within its borders.  
This paper will explore the European Union’s attempts to influence and penalize 
its Member States’ illiberal policies. What post-accession leverage mechanisms does the 
European Union employ with Member States to attempt to correct illiberal behavior? The 
post-accession leverage mechanisms refer to both the formal and informal pressures, 
including the punitive infringement procedure and implicit economic pressures. Once the 
European Union engages in corrective measures with a Member State, what domestic and 
European factors limit the European Union’s ability to contain illiberalism? The issues of 
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Member States’ quality of democracy within the European Union and the European 
Union’s ability to maintain liberal democracy are significant for understanding current 
and future European Union internal relations.  
Methods and Data 
 In order to research the European Union’s post-accession leverage against illiberal 
Member States, this paper will take a qualitative case-study approach. The hypotheses of 
this study are hinged on the terminology of soft and hard, or informal and formal, 
pressures that will be outlined in the literature review. The cases for this study will 
include Hungary and Poland. 
 There are three main hypotheses for this study, all of which pertain to the role of 
domestic factors on the given set of known mechanisms of EU influence.  
H1: If the EU is exerting both judicial and economic pressures, illiberal behavior 
can only be corrected if the Member State is economically vulnerable or if the 
incumbent government is politically vulnerable.  
H2: If the incumbent government’s delegates to the European Parliament have 
strategic value to their party caucus, the EU will not be able to fully exert 
economic and/or social pressures. 
H3.A: When the EU exerts post-accession pressure, if it includes ideology-based 
social pressure, determined illiberal governments will not modify their behavior.  
H3.B: The more the EU utilizes ideology-based social pressure, the more likely 
the Member States’ incumbent illiberal government will be to resist the EU.  
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The hypotheses above are not mutually exclusive, but rather potentially 
compounded to illustrate the full political and economic landscape of post-accession 
maintenance of liberal democracy.  
 The independent variables throughout this study will be the type of EU pressure, 
domestic Member State economic factors, and Member State political factors. The types 
of EU pressure are hard, which refers to the infringement process, and soft, which 
includes economic and social mechanisms. Domestic economic factors will measure 
economic vulnerability with common indicators, such as unemployment, annual percent 
GDP growth, and deficit to GDP. Political factors for Member States pertain to the 
Member State’s relationship with the European Parliament (i.e. any party loyalty or 
advantageousness),  the domestic status of the main illiberal actors (ie. internal power 
shifts, election loss, coalition conflict), and any significant leaders’ statements on 
illiberalism and European politics.  
 The dependent variable will be compliance and quality of democracy. The 
dependent variable will be measured by observable changes in behavior, like reversing an 
illiberal policy after exertion of EU pressure, and the V-DEM liberal democracy score. 
While compliance does not necessarily directly or immediately equate to enhanced 
quality of democracy, compliance to EU norms and values relates to correction of 
illiberal behavior. Consistently low scores on the liberal democracy index may also 
indicate worsening of illiberalism despite surface-level, observable changes in behavior.  
Data for the Hungary and Poland cases will focus on episodes of illiberal activity 
since 2004, after both case countries were granted EU membership. Hungary and Poland 
are the chosen cases for study because they are Member States with notable illiberal 
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behavior. Moreover, all two cases have had illiberal governments, not just fringe parties 
or other sub-national actors. It is important to note that while the case countries are in 
Eastern and Central Europe, this study is not aimed at making a specific argument about 
democracy in all Eastern European Member States.  
Data for the case studies will come from news articles and various databases. The 
tracing of illiberal events and behavior will be cited from news articles from major 
sources like the BBC, The Guardian, The EU Observer, The New York Times, and the 
Financial Times. Electoral data to track the domestic political circumstances of the 
illiberal actors will come from the online database Election Resources, with supporting 
information from contemporary news coverage of the elections. Information on EU 
statements and activity will come from a range of online databases from the EU’s 
network of websites and resources, such as the database on press releases, infringement 
processes, Parliament members, and annual funding. The economic factors of GDP 
growth and unemployment will be sourced from the World Bank database on national 
economies. The national deficit to GDP indicator is from the EU’s statistical resource 
Eurostat. The liberal democracy score is based on the annual V-DEM liberal democracy 
indicator.  
Literature Review 
The question of the European Union’s democratic merits is not a new area of 
study. There are both strong critics and strong proponents of the European Union’s 
impact on regional democracy. With the recent groundswells of illiberal movements, 
parties, and Member State governments, the conceptual debate has taken on real 
consequences for the European people. 
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Beneath the tensions stirring in the European Union lies a greater global tension 
that warrants a brief summary: the dissonance between liberalism and illiberalism in 
democracies. For this paper, in accordance with the common academic definition, 
liberalism is the political system characterized by “the rule of law, a separation of 
powers, and the protection of basic liberties” (Zakaria 1997). In contrast, an illiberal 
democracy is an elected regime that lacks or actively undermines institutional and 
individual liberties. In The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Zakaria (1997) argues the global 
spread of democracy does not necessarily spread liberalism (27). Zakaria’s distinct 
separation of democracy and liberalism ultimately blames democratization before 
development of liberalism as the central cause for rising illiberal democratic regimes. 
However, in Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One without the Other, Plattner 
(1998) builds on Zakaria’s separation of liberalism and democracy, but instead argues 
that electoral democracies are preconditional for liberalism. 
The distinction between democracy and liberalism is important for understanding 
the European Union’s current problem. Both Zakaria and Plattner identify a temporal and 
ideological issue within the spread of democracy that potentially lays the groundwork for 
future illiberalism in the regime. The European Union has a unique method of 
democratization, commonly referred to as the Integration Model. The Integration Model 
is democratization through European Union membership. In Europe Undivided, 
Vachudova (2005) describes the membership accession process in three key terms: 
meritocracy, active leverage, and passive leverage. In this approach to the European 
Union’s integration model, countries have the means, supervision, and incentive to 
become liberal democracies. The meritocratic nature of the membership process 
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manifests as oversight and yearly reports that show progress towards membership with 
progress towards full compliance with EU laws and standards. The candidate countries 
must also integrate the EU legal system the Acquis Communautaire as well as the 
additional requirement of the Copenhagen Criteria, in which many of the protections for 
ethnic groups are implemented. The three principles of the Copenhagen Criteria include 
institutional democratic stability, open market economies, and adherence to EU standards 
(EU 1993). Lastly, the European Union’s vast market provides implicit encouragement 
for the full compliance of the EU’s rules. 
The existing understandings of the Integration Model, and arguments of its 
success, are important for this research because the illiberal governments within the 
European Union undermine two core beliefs about the relationship between the EU and 
its Member States: membership guarantees liberal democracy; the European Union’s 
economic appeal is enough to secure high commitment levels in current and potential 
Member States. Dimitrova and Pridham (2004) also analyze the European Union’s 
Integration Model in International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and 
Eastern Europe, where they identify the economic and political appeal of the EU as a 
significant factor in the effectiveness of the dual membership-democratization process. 
Essentially, the economic pull of the European Union overrides the conditionality of 
adherence to the Acquis Communautaire and Copenhagen Criteria. In this framework, the 
Integration Model situates liberalism as contingent on the political and economic allure of 
the European Union. Dimitrova and Pridham also highlight the temporality of the 
accession process as a driving factor of commitment (109). The long duration of the 
membership process puts pressure on candidates to fulfil the conditions and wards against 
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stalemates and total fallouts. The various elements of contingency and commitment 
discussed in the literature surrounding the Integration Model emphasize the significance 
of pre-accession processes, while assuming consistency in the post-accession 
relationships. The Integration Model’s high conditionality vanishes upon the candidate’s 
entry into the European Union. As a Member State, a country is not subject to the same 
leverages and conditions that function to secure liberal democracy in candidate states. 
Democratic backsliding within the European Union despite the meritocratic and 
highly conditional membership process is at the crux of the problem in Eastern Europe 
today. The issue is discussed in Sedelmeier’s Anchoring Democracy from Above? The 
European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession. 
Sedelmeier (2014) argues that partisan politics and weak normative consensus limits the 
European Union’s ability to penalize infringing members and use the Article 7 
sanctioning mechanism that revokes a Member State’s vote. Sedelmeier (2014) also 
identifies three alternative means of attempted behavior-shaping by the European Union: 
social pressure, infringement procedures, and issue linkages. In the cases of Hungary and 
Romania, Sedelmeier (2014) found that changes to Romania’s illiberal practices were 
potentially a result of increased vulnerability to economic pressure from the European 
Union, although attempts to correct illiberal behavior were curbed mainly by partisanship 
within the European Parliament. The inclusion of European Parliament politics 
contextualizes the decision-making and European-Member State relationships in a 
political environment, rather than a vacuum.  
Distinguishing types of post-accession leverage in conjunction with analyzing 
domestic factors are integral to the inquisition into democratic backsliding in the 
9 
 
European Union. Like Sedelmeier, Iusmen in EU Leverage and Democratic Backsliding 
in Central and Eastern Europe seeks to contextualize the EU’s efforts to correct behavior 
in Member States. In Iusmen’s approach to intervention, it is necessary that a set of 
domestic political factors align for a country to be amenable to European Union 
influence. In the case of Romania, Iusmen (2015) identifies three main domestic factors 
that influenced the European Union’s attempts at corrective pressures: political 
miscalculations, coalition tensions, and opportunistic actions (17). Altogether, the critical 
focus is on domestic political disorganization and self-interest as conditions that made 
Romania pliant to EU corrective pressures. According to Iusman (2015), illiberal actors 
in Member States can be influenced if they are concerned about loss of power, either 
within a coalition or with the electorate.  
The relationship between EU post-accession leverage and domestic factors 
extends beyond self-interest and political vulnerability. There are multifaceted political 
and economic relationships involved in EU-Member State corrective interactions. In A 
Test of European Union Post-Accession Influence, Gherghina and Soare (2016) formulate 
post-accession strategies based on the assumption of Member State commitment. For 
example, in contrast with the other analyses of post-accession leverage, Gherghina and 
Soare (2016) suggest an additive approach to influence. In this additive approach to EU 
intervention, increased funding and socialization are meant to bring straying members 
closer to the political and economic community of the EU. This argument differs from 
the other descriptions of post-accession leverage that highlight the threat of benefit loss 
and social alienation as means of influence. However, Gherghina and Soare (2016) 
acknowledge the role of decreased funding in shaping Member State behavior. They note 
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that in Romania’s case, their status as one of the poorest Member States has made the 
concern of reduced EU funding a tool for post-accession conditionality (Gherghina and 
Soare, 810). Connecting to Iusmen’s (2015) understanding of domestic factors as 
conditions for effective influence, Romania’s political and economic status as a low-
earner made it particularly more pliant to EU intervention.   
In addition to partisanship connections between Member States and the European 
Parliament preventing full implementation of post-accession leverage, political 
complications within the EU also strain the corrective relationship with illiberal Member 
States. Gherghina and Soare (2016) focus on the impact of political disagreements within 
the European Parliament rather than partisan dynamics discussed by Sedelmeier (2014). 
Their research found that conflicting political interpretations of illiberal violations, as 
well as the core concepts of liberal governance at hand, such as the rule of law hindered 
EU pressure (Gherghina and Soare, 810). There was also an issue of institutional voice; 
the EU’s various entities and political actors had difficulty sharing a common position 
(Gherghina and Soare,810). This kind of political inconsistency within the EU expresses 
the reality of deliberation, but also illustrates the negative impact of fragmentation on EU 
intervention. Overall, politicalization of penalty procedures disadvantage the European 
Union’s authority and ability to correct illiberal behavior.  
Ideological domestic factors are an important dimension of evaluating the efficacy 
of EU influence on Member States. Gherghina and Soare (2016) argue that post-
accession compliance to EU norms and values is couched in a desire to be a high-
performing, respectable Member State (801). In this perspective, commitment to the 
community begets commitment to EU norms and values. While Gherghina and Soare’s 
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concept of a respectable Member State reinforces the earlier ideas of political and 
economic appeal outweighing the conditionality of membership, it also seems to be based 
on the assumption that there is post-accession meritocracy or rewards system for well-
behaving Member States. A defining characteristic of European Union membership is the 
lack of a formalized internal rewards system for compliant behavior. Rewards for 
compliance is a main attribute of the pre-accession political landscape, in which 
candidates are rewarded with EU membership after demonstrated progress and 
adherence. Additionally, the theory that Member States are driven to commitment and 
good behavior by respectability and community approval excludes the role of 
Euroscepticism in the Member States undergoing nationalist trends.  
Within the issue of the European Union’s post-accession influence, there is also 
the matter of the various supervisory and punitive entities and mechanisms within the 
European Union. For the purpose of this paper, two entities will be discussed as they 
appear in the extant literature: the infringement procedure and Article 7. The 
infringement procedure is the standard structural instrument for behavior correction. The 
infringement procedure is a multi-step judicial process that leads to the European Court 
of Justice and involves multiple opportunities for Member States to settle their cases 
through early correction. Scholars’ evaluations of the infringement procedure vary 
slightly in terms of its overall effectiveness. In Can courts rescue national democracy? 
Judicial safeguards against democratic backsliding in the EU, Blauberger and Keleman 
argue that judicial processes alone are not adequate tools for halting or preventing 
democratic backsliding (321). They suggest that political intervention, such as social 
pressure and sanctions, in conjunction with the infringement procedure is necessary for 
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any actual influence over a Member State (Blauberger 2017, 332). In Fines against 
member states: An effective new tool in EU infringement proceedings?, Falkner 
acknowledges the difficulty of penalization within the existing infringement procedure 
framework and outlines the “hard” and “soft” enforcement tools employed by the EU 
during infringement (47). Falkner (2016) finds that while judicial processes alone are 
ineffective, the concurrent use of  “soft pressure” in the form of social shaming is also 
ultimately ineffective (47). Both Falkner (2016) and Blauberger et al. (2017) argue for a 
diversification of the EU’s pressure mechanisms used during infringement proceedings, 
but also recognize the importance of judicial penalties in Member State behavior 
correction.  
Article 7 is a pivotal instrument in the landscape of EU influence, penalty, and 
behavior correction in its Member States. Different from the other judicial processes or 
economic sanctions, Article 7 penalizes offending Member States by suspending EU 
voting rights. On the issue of Article 7’s role in post-accession leverage, Gherghina and 
Soare (2016) argue that difficulties with implementation and operability, as well as 
fragmented inter-institutional consensus and political dynamics hinders the credibility of 
Article 7 and the EU’ ability to safeguard liberal democratic standards (800). Within their 
argument, the politicization of the Article 7 penalty and the political dimension of “going 
nuclear” plays a large role in the EU’s reluctance to trigger the Article 7 proceedings 
(Gherghina et al. 2016, 812).  In Political safeguards against democratic backsliding in 
the EU: the limits of material sanctions and the scope of social pressure, Sedelmeier 
frames Article 7 framed as the ultimate form of material leverage, or membership-based 
leverage. Besides the vast political obstacles to triggering Article 7, Sedelmeier (2017) 
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argues that material leverage loses its efficacy in the face of determined illiberal Member 
States because the threat of losing EU rights, membership, and funding do not necessarily 
register to the illiberal leaders, whose main concern is maintaining power (342). Despite 
the literature’s variance in opinion on the effectiveness of social pressure, Sedelmeier 
(2017) suggests that social pressure, especially through formalized instruments that 
monitor Member States, is most effective when applied consistently and thoroughly 
(338). Sedelmeier’s discussion of illiberal governments’ impenetrability in the face of 
material leverage will be important in this paper’s contribution to the understanding of 
illiberal Member State’s resistance to the EU ideological authority. 
The arguments put forth by scholars studying the European Union’s strategies of 
influence outline both the mechanisms and limitations of post-accession leverage. There 
are economic, judicial and social pressures that the European Union can deploy in 
attempt to correct illiberal behavior. Limitations of the EU’s ability to influence Member 
States are rooted in European partisanship and concerns over post-accession Member 
State commitment. When analyzing relations between the European Union and individual 
Member States, certain domestic factors are also significant indicators of limitation or 
amenability. Political fragmentation and economic vulnerability are two main domestic 
circumstances identified in the literature that increase the likelihood of compliance. 
However, the literature does not clearly explore the domestic factors that may make 
compliance less likely.  
In contribution to the literature, this paper will focus on the limitations of EU 
post-accession corrective behavior due to domestic factors in conjunction with 
institutional shortcomings. This paper will also analyze the impact of political 
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discreditation of the European Union by illiberal governments on the EU’s attempts of 
post-accession leverage. As the political landscape in Eastern and Central Europe 
continues to develop, it is important that academia reacts and adapts to changes in the 
state of democracy.  
Hungary 
 This section on Hungary will analyze illiberal activity since its entry into the EU 
in 2004 and the European Union’s mechanisms of post-accession intervention against 
democratic backsliding. First, I will briefly describe the historical underpinnings of 
Hungary’s nationalist illiberalism. Then, I will trace the illiberal activity in Hungary, 
based on the ways in which FIDESZ has violated the laws, norms, and values of EU 
liberal democracy. This section will define episodes of illiberal activity including 
constitutional reform, the refugee crisis response, and the marginalization of civil society 
and the press. The following subsections will discuss the interactions between Hungary 
and the European Union’s various post-accession leverage mechanisms. I will divide 
those sections into analysis of “Hard Pressure,” the judicial penalty system, and “Soft 
Pressure,” economic and social pressures. The next section will identify and discuss the 
domestic factors that predispose Hungary to be resilient to EU influence. The purpose of 
this case study is to outline the ways in which the Orban-led FIDESZ regime has created 
a political environment that simultaneously erodes the fundamentals of liberal democracy 
and resists EU attempts at behavior correction.  
Hungary’s current illiberalism has foundations throughout the twentieth century. 
A significant theme in Hungary’s path towards far-right nationalism is irredentism, a 
movement to reclaim lost land. After World War I, the victors punished Hungary with the 
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Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920. The treaty’s terms defined Hungary’s new postwar 
boundaries, which resulted in Hungary losing 71.4% of its territory and 63.6% of its 
population, including millions of ethnic Hungarians (Vardy 1983). With a solid one-third 
of the Hungarian nation dispersed behind the borders of neighboring states, a new 
dynamic of minority-relations and diaspora was formed in the region. Hungarian 
irredentism is significant to consider before analyzing post-accession illiberal activity 
because it provides insight into the historical underpinnings for the conservative 
nationalist rhetoric driving illiberal politics. Hungary’s particular strain of ethnic 
nationalism gave a way for illiberal actors to gain political capital, and ultimately escalate 
the country into illiberalism.  
The main illiberal actor is the far-right FIDESZ party, led by Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban. After the fall of the Soviet Union, FIDESZ started out as a liberal and pro-
West, but the 1990s witnessed a platform shift towards nationalist economic 
protectionism against foreign capital and influence (Hockenos 2011). Between 1998 and 
2002, the exposure to power and Hungarian elites connected Orban with far-reaching 
resources for his national populist message (Hockenos 2011). Orban and FIDESZ 
gradually came to dominance in parliament. Between 1998 and 2010, FIDESZ has gained 
a powerful supermajority in the parliament. Their main political rival is the Jobbik party, 
also a far-right nationalist party.  
 Illiberal Activity 
 In this subsection, the tracing of illiberal activity will demonstrate the deep, 
structural nature of FIDESZ’s impact on the Hungarian government. Many of FIDESZ’s 
violations of liberal democratic norms and values have made international news. 
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Headlines describe Orban as a “troublemaker” and an “authoritarian” with FIDESZ as an 
iron trap around the whole of Hungary. Illiberal activity includes legislation pushed 
through by FIDESZ, but also public rhetoric and non-legislative activity, such as state 
mistreatment of refugees.  
A pronounced and early example of the Orban-FIDESZ government undermining 
liberal democracy in Hungary is the 2011 ratification of a new constitution.  In the 2010 
elections, FIDESZ obtained 52.7 percent of the vote and a resulting parliamentary 
supermajority (Election Resources, Hungary). With the supermajority, the 1949 
constitution was nullified on the basis that it was the foundation of communist tyranny in 
Hungary (Dempsey 2011), which rendered its history of case law invalid. The 2011 
constitution entrenched FIDESZ and its ideology into the state structure while 
endangering necessary checks and balances. Within the FIDESZ Constitution are 
Cardinal Acts, which are specifying amendments regulating issues of varying weight, 
including “the election of Members of Parliament [and] the protection of families” (The 
Hungarian State website).The Cardinal Acts operate as placeholders in the constitution 
for FIDESZ to later pass fundamental laws with a two-thirds majority (The Fundamental 
Law of Hungary 2012, Article T(4)). In a report on the new constitution, the Venice 
Commission criticized the use of Cardinal Acts, which they argue include detailed 
regulations instead of just basic principles (2013). Illiberal changes in the FIDESZ 
Constitution are largely entangled in the Cardinal Acts and amendments.  
The judiciary was arguably most impacted by the 2011 constitution ratification 
and period of swift structural reform following ratification. The retirement age of judges 
and agency of the Constitutional Court have both been directly under fire by FIDESZ 
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law. A 2012 law abruptly lowered the retirement age of judges and prosecutors from 70 
to 62, within a transition period of just one year (European Commission, 2012). The law, 
without clear justification for the sudden eight-year adjustment, would trigger the loss of 
hundreds of judges in the Hungarian court systems. With the retirement age requirement, 
FIDESZ attempted to purge the judiciary and pack FIDESZ-aligned judges into the 
courts. A similar approach was taken to the Constitutional Court itself. Between 2010 and 
2012, the number of judges allowed on the court was increased from 11 to 15, allowing 
Orban to pack it with FIDESZ allies, and then the jurisdiction of the court was strictly 
limited (Helsinki Committee 2015). The judicial review of the Constitutional Court was 
restricted to only laws that have impact on the budget, including tax and spending 
programs, unless those budgetary laws violate specific rights (Krugman 2011). Packing 
the courts and sharply undermining judicial review effectively renders the judiciary’s 
check on the FIDESZ legislative agenda futile.  
A restricted judiciary has a great electoral impact in addition to legislative power 
dynamics. One of the significant changes made to the Hungarian constitution was the 
amendment to electoral supervision. The new constitution stipulates that the Election 
Commission is composed of members of the governing party, rather than a politically-
diverse supervisory entity (Brodsky 2015). Electoral districts have also been manipulated 
under new law: a two-thirds majority has been instituted as the new requirement for 
redrawing district boundaries. Undermining the election supervisory capacity of the 
judiciary with changes to both the partisan composition and decision-making processes 
neutralizes any potential opposition. The reform to the Election Commission allows 
FIDESZ to predispose elections to their favor while ensuring that the Election 
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Commission would not investigate any FIDESZ victory. Ultimately, the amendments to 
the electoral process reinforce and perpetuate FIDESZ’s majority through long-lasting 
structural changes.  
 In conjunction with the electoral amendments protected by the new judiciary, 
FIDESZ’s constitution re-defined the Hungarian media landscape. Within the new 
constitution, FIDESZ bans “political advertising during the election campaign in any 
venue other than in the public broadcast media, which is controlled by the all-Fidesz 
media board” (Scheppele 2013). Mass media law also permits the government to sanction 
journalists and press outlets, as well as prior restraints on the press through a strict 
registration process (Council of Europe, 2011). Regulations on the media, and 
particularly political content and campaigning in the media, dangerously curb the 
freedom of the press. Through marginalization of the press, FIDESZ also smothers 
political opposition, further consolidating its rule.  
 One of the more visible cases of Hungary’s escalating illiberalism and 
devaluation of European Union norms is its reaction to the refugee crisis. In 2015, the 
influx of Syrian refugees was responded to with a series of propaganda campaigns, 
proposals for border walls, and mass arrests of refugees (Kingsley 2015). Hungary’s 
shutdown of the border, detention of refugees in “transit zones,” and widely reported 
abuse by the police (Samuels, Booth 2015) indicates a foundational disregard for 
international norm fueled by FIDESZ’s ethnic nationalist politics. The Hungarian 
government’s mistreatment of the refugees is in direct violation with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which demands signatories to provide certain human rights and protections 
to asylum-seekers (UN 2015). Moreover, Hungary’s blatant unwillingness to coordinate 
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with the rest of the European Union on relocation efforts during the crisis reveals the 
empowered, mutinous nationalist stance of the Orban government vis a vis EU decision-
making. Since the relocation quota plan was introduced in 2015, Orban and other 
FIDESZ officials have rejected the quota system, accused it of violating Hungarian 
sovereignty, and refused to accept any migrants (UN 2015). Because the refugee crisis 
strikes at the core of FIDESZ’s ethnic nationalism and Euroscepticism, it provides a clear 
window through which to witness the Hungarian government’s distancing from European 
Union standards of policy and behavior.  
 Most recently, the Orban regime has crackdown on civil society in Hungary, with 
targeted legislation against Non-Governmental Organizations and universities with 
foreign funding. In 2017, parliament passed a law stating that any foreign-funded 
university in Hungary must sign an intergovernmental agreement and prove that the 
university operates in the home country as well (Keszthelyi 2017). The law effectively 
shut down the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest due to its founding by 
international financier and Orban-foe George Soros (Szakacs, Dunai 2017). While 
thousands protested the university’s closing, it did not prevent Orban from launching a 
similar attack against liberal civil society organizations with foreign funding (Reuters 
2017). The crackdown on the CEU and civil society NGOs is a continuation of FIDESZ’s 
marginalization of opposition and a flagrant breach of freedom of association protected in 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Reuters 2017).  
 Hungary’s escalating pattern of behavior with the rise in power of the FIDESZ 
party illustrates the inability of the European Union’s post-accession leverage 
mechanisms to have any deep impact on the illiberal government. The eight years since 
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FIDESZ’s electoral landslide have been defined by serious acts against the rule of law, 
the judiciary, the freedom of the press, political opposition, civil society, multinational 
agreements, and human rights. Orban and FIDESZ’s changes to the Hungarian 
government have two significant qualities: they impose long-term structural change and 
attempt to perpetuate FIDESZ political authority.  
Post-Accession Hard Pressure 
 This section will describe and analyze the interactions between European Union 
authorities and the Hungarian government regarding its illiberal activity. “Hard Pressure” 
post-accession mechanisms include the formal, supervisory processes within the EU such 
as the infringement procedure and Article 7. Hard pressure mechanisms are criticized for 
perceived ineffectiveness and political stigma, but are still deemed an essential 
instrument of the European Union’s authority over Member States.  
 Hard pressure was exerted by the EU in all cases described in the previous 
section. The table below outlines the implementation of hard pressure and the respective 
outcomes to related illiberal activity. 
Interactions Between EU and Hungary during Hard Pressure 
Activity EU Penalty Response Outcome 
Ratification of new 
constitution (2011) 
Infringement launched 
on concerns within the 
new constitution: 
independence of 
judiciary and central 
bank (Jan. 2012) 
Orban backtracks on 
disputed central 
bank laws 
European 
Commission states 
satisfaction with 
changes to central 
bank law; other 
aspects of constitution 
“will be monitored” 
Judge Retirement 
Law (2012) 
Infringement launched 
and quickly found the 
law in violation (Mar. 
2012); Court of 
After COJ decision, 
Parliament amends 
judge retirement age, 
now lowered to 65 
Due to reduced 
severity of judge 
retirement, the 
infringement case is 
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Justice declares law 
unjustified 
discrimination (Nov. 
2012) 
over ten years (rather 
than 62 over one year) 
closed. 
Media Reform 
(2011-2012) 
Infringement launched 
against reform 
reducing press 
liberty(Jan. 2011) 
Parliament addresses 
banned content and 
reporting requirements  
The Commission 
drops proceeding  
Breaches during 
Refugee Crisis 
(2015-present) 
Infringement launched 
against asylum law 
and lack of violation 
of refugee protections 
(Dec. 2015) 
Hungary continues 
violations of EU 
values and refugee 
protections; 
launches a 
referendum to 
formally reject the 
EU quota mandate 
(2016) 
Conflict is ongoing; 
the infringement 
procedure did not 
pressure Hungary 
into correction; 
Commission 
launches additional 
infringements 
(2017) 
Marginalization of 
civil society and 
universities (2017-
present) 
Commission 
launches 
infringement against 
the higher education 
law (2017); 
Parliament passes 
resolution calling 
for Article 7 (May 
2017) 
Hungary makes 
retaliatory 
statements and 
passes similar law 
on foreign- funded 
NGOs (June 2017) 
Conflict is ongoing; 
the infringement 
procedure did not 
pressure Hungary into 
correction; 
Commission launches 
additional 
infringements (2017) 
Table 1 
 The table illustrates two troubling patterns that arise when the European Union 
engages with Hungary in post-accession hard pressure: the superficial nature of behavior 
correction and the worsening neglect of the European Commission and Court of Justice’s 
directives within the infringement procedure over time.  
One of the compelling cases of correction through hard pressure illustrated in 
Table 1 is the 2012 Judge Retirement Law. The infringement case itself lasted 
approximately a year, but the FIDESZ-ruled Parliament did not amend the law in 
question until the Court of Justice released its definitive decision that the law was in 
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breach of European Union standards. However, it is important to note that the Court of 
Justice decision opposed the law because it was “unjustifiable” and therefore 
discriminatory. When the parliament passed the amendment to slightly raise the 
retirement age and increase the transition period, the law was only technically adjusted to 
satisfy the authorities. The act of systematically eliminating judges in favor of FIDESZ-
aligned appointments did not change in the amendment, only its immediacy. The 
substance of what the Court of Justice deemed “unjustifiable discrimination” was only 
superficially reconfigured to meet the standards of the infringement procedure. The 2012 
Judge Retirement Law is a strong example of how hard pressure can yield correction of 
behavior, but that correction may be superficial.  
The table also demonstrates a structural issue of the infringement proceedings: the 
asymmetry of scope in the Commission’s addressing of the potential breach. In all of the 
cases shown above, the infringement proceedings are hinged on the critique of a specific 
law or set of laws. However, the illiberal activity committed by the FIDESZ regime, was 
widespread, systematized, and restructured whole institutions. One of the most clear 
examples of this issue is the ratification of the FIDESZ Constitution in 2011. While the 
European Commission launched infringements on specific laws within the sweeping 
reforms and outlined the threat against rule of law in the related documents, the 
proceedings did not have the capacity to legally address the constitution as a whole, or 
the act of nullifying the old constitution. The narrow focus inherent to the legal nature of 
the infringement is not necessarily fit to address the breadth and depth of illiberal 
transformation of the state.  
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The specificity structured into the infringement proceedings did contribute to the 
correction of the central bank law that would entrench FIDESZ control. As seen in the 
table, parliament did backtrack on the law after the European Commission launched an 
infringement. However, the central bank law is an example of informal punitive 
mechanisms being used by the EU to influence behavior in conjunction with the 
infringement procedure. The additional informal instruments of post-accession leverage, 
used with and without hard pressure, will be discussed in the next subsection on soft 
pressure.  
There were two instances in which the Members of the European Parliament 
threatened triggering Article 7 against Hungary. In 2015, Orban threatened to reinstate 
the death penalty, which is explicitly in violation of the Treaties and of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (European Parliament 2015). In response to Orban’s statements, the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs debated 
death penalty and passed a resolution stating that any serious attempt to reintroduce the 
death penalty would trigger Article 7 and revoke a Member State’s voting rights 
(European Parliament 2015). In this case, Orban did not continue to make inflammatory 
comments about the reintroduction of the death penalty.  
In 2017, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the launch of 
Article 7 proceedings. The resolution cited Hungary’s transgressions against asylum-
seekers and non-governmental organizations, particularly the shutdown of the Central 
European University (Keszethlyi 2017). The resolution represents the first phase of 
Article 7 proceedings, which is an inquisitive stage designed to prevent an actual breach 
in European Union foundations (Keszethlyi 2017). However, the European Parliament’s 
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call for Article 7 did not prevent or cease illiberal activity in Hungary, particularly the 
FIDESZ regime’s offense against civil society and asylum seekers. In this case, the 
illiberal activity continued without any modification, and the issues at stake were 
entrenched in FIDESZ’s nationalist frame.  
In response to the resolution, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó stated “European 
institutions are clearly unable to accept the fact that despite the application of 
international pressure, the government of Hungary is continuing to practice a migration 
policy that is exclusively aimed at ensuring the security of Hungary and the Hungarian 
people… We are now witness to a new attack on Hungary by George Soros’ network” 
(Matthews 2017). Not only did the European Union’s exertion of hard pressure in this 
case fail to slow illiberal activity, it incited the illiberal government into a harder stance. 
Szijjártó’s statement demonstrates the negative politicization of EU hard pressure. 
Szijjártó uses the EU’s criticism to reinforce the FIDESZ policies on asylum and foreign-
funding NGOs, both significant manifestations of the party’s nationalist ideology.  
 The interactions between the European Union formal penalty system and the 
FIDESZ government are characterized by superficial change, retaliative statements, and 
continued illiberal activity. The narrow focus of the infringement procedure not only fails 
to undertake the full reality of systemic illiberal reform, but it also has no compelling 
compounding effect in the face of Hungary’s neglect. In the sequences of illiberal activity 
regarding the refugee crisis and civil society, the addition of infringement cases launched 
against Hungary still did not alter behavior. In the case of Hungary, the lack of efficacy in 
hard pressure tactics reflects poorly on the conventional paradigm of penalty and post-
accession influence in the European Union. 
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Post-Accession Soft Pressure 
 This section will analyze the interactions between Hungary and the European 
Union when the EU is engaging in informal instruments of influence, or “Soft Pressure.” 
Soft pressure involves attempts of post-accession leverage that do not include the 
infringement procedure: economic pressure, whether that be the withholding of funds or 
economic relief; social pressure from political actors, such as Members of European 
Parliament, and public outcry from groups both inside and outside the state. 
Economic pressure is an important instrument within soft pressure because the 
European Union’s economic allure and reputation is an integral aspect of the EU’s pre-
accession leverage. The table below illustrates both additive and subtractive methods of 
economic pressure employed by the EU in attempt to shape illiberal activity.   
Additive and Subtractive Economic Soft Pressure 
Event Additive Subtractive Outcome 
Constitutional 
Reform, Central 
Bank Law (2011) 
None EU suspends aid 
talks  
Central bank law 
amended (2012) 
Judge Retirement 
Law (2011-2012) 
EU resumes aid 
talks (April 2012) 
Commission suspends 
the Cohesion fund and 
states that if there is 
no change by 2015 the 
resource is 
permanently 
withdrawn (Feb 2012) 
Orban rejects 
conditions of EU-IMF 
aid, illiberal reform 
and retirement law 
persists (until 2013) 
and aid talks end 
Constitutional Court 
and Media Reform 
(2013) 
EU releases 
Hungary from 
excessive deficit 
procedure 
None Media amendment 
amended slightly, but 
no changes regarding 
independence of the 
judiciary  
Table 2  
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As mentioned in the literature review, additive pressure involves cases in which 
the European Union increases resources for the Member State in attempt to deter or halt 
illiberal activity. Subtractive pressure is the withdrawal of resources to punish the 
illiberal behavior. The table includes the manipulation of aid talks, special funds, and the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The EDP is a process through which Member States 
with debt exceeding 60% of GDP reconfigure fiscal policy under EU supervision 
(European Commission 2017). 
 The manipulation of the 2011-2012 aid talks between the EU, IMF, and Hungary 
throughout the illiberal reforms reflects a series of back-and-forth exchanges between the 
EU and the FIDESZ government. During the initial period of constitutional reform in 
2011 and the passing of a law that reduced the independence of the central bank, the 
European Union suspended financial aid talks. When parliament amended the central 
bank law to reinstate some independence, the EU resumed talks, only for them to end 
again when Orban publicly rejected the conditions of the IMF loan. Hungary’s lapse of 
behavior during the negotiations, oscillating between agreement and disagreement with 
continued lack of policy correction, demonstrates a similar pattern of superficial and 
impermanent responses as seen in the previous section on hard pressure. All the cases 
included in the table above were instances when both soft and hard pressures were 
employed by the EU.  
 The economic pressure implemented in the case of the Judge Retirement Law 
demonstrates an interesting use of combined additive and subtractive attempts of 
influence. Unlike the implementation of hard pressure, economic pressure may have a 
compounding impact with continued deprivation or supply of resources. However, in the 
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case of the Judge Retirement Law, no attempt at post-accession leverage was successful 
until the Court of Justice decision yielded the 2013 amendments. During the suspension 
of the Cohesion Fund, Commissioner Hahn stated that the decision was meant to 
reinforce the EU’s economic governance and was not meant to be “some kind of 
punishment” (European Commission 2012). Despite the Commissioner’s statement that 
the suspension of the fund was strictly budgetary, the assertion of EU authority during the 
time of parliament’s illiberal policy making and Orban’s uncooperation in negotiation 
was a significant reclamation of the EU’s mechanisms of governance.  
 Like the Cohesion Fund, the EU’s grant funding to Hungary may have been 
potentially manipulated to exert pressure, although less publicly. During the period of 
illiberal activity, there were sharp changes in the European Union’s grant funding to 
projects in Hungary. EU development grants dispense funds to small business, NGOs, 
and researchers for various projects in alignment with EU objectives (European 
Commission 2012). 
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 The graph above illustrates a rise in the amount of grant funding to Hungary while 
a general decline in the number of grants recipients. From 2014 to 2015, the overall grant 
fund rose from approximately twenty-five million Euros to one hundred-and-twenty 
million Euros, with a sharp increase in 2016 to nearly four hundred-and-fifty million 
Euros dispersed among only seven hundred-and-sixty recipients. While the justification 
for the shift in funding is not described in a public statement or rationale, the increase in 
grant funds starting in 2014 coincides with the period of time in which the FIDESZ 
government began violating basic rights and freedoms with their policies. Moreover, the 
slight increase in 2011-2012 coincides with the initial major illiberal act ratifying the 
FIDESZ Constitution and its sweeping amendments. The funding information represents 
an overall trend towards additive pressure, or even potentially the intentional funding of 
EU-aligned entities and civil society groups in a country under a Eurosceptic and hostile 
government.  
 In addition to economic pressure, social mechanisms are also an integral aspect of 
soft pressure. Social pressure involves statements from individual politicians, like 
Members of the European Parliament, or groups, like political coalitions. In the case of 
the death penalty, which was discussed in the previous section on the threatening of 
Article 7, social pressure played a significant aspect in the controversy surrounding 
Orban’s statements. The day after Orban made the remarks on the death penalty, then-
European Parliament President Martin Schulz issued a statement saying “[Orbán] had 
assured him that the Hungarian government had no plans to take any steps to reintroduce 
the death penalty and that the Hungarian government would respect and honour all EU 
Treaties and legislation” (European Parliament 2015). Schulz’s statement is an attempt to 
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both diffuse the tension and increase the public stakes of Orban’s commitment to 
honoring the EU policy on the death penalty. However, the day following Schulz’s phone 
call, Orban repeated his initial statements on the reintroduction of the death penalty 
(European Parliament 2015). While Shulz’s statements meant to publicly corner Orban, 
Orban’s lapse in position undermined Shulz’s attempt to uphold accountability.    
 Members of Parliament also attempted to exert coordinated social pressure in 
2017 in an effort to slow Orban’s escalating illiberal trajectory. FIDESZ is a notable 
member of the European People’s Party (EPP), a conservative European political party. 
In an April 2017 party meeting, the delegate from Luxembourg Frank Engel stated, 
“They [Fidesz] have to understand that this circus - where every other month or twice a 
year at least, the whole EPP does nothing but defend Fidesz - is over. We will not do it 
anymore” (Zalan 2017). Another delegate, Esther De Lange, also criticized FIDESZ’s 
place in European politics: “Is your place among the autocratic leaders [like Russian 
president] Putin or [Turkey's president] Erdogan, or do you belong to a Europe based on 
the core values that you yourself fought for in '89?” (ibid). The statements from the other 
EPP delegates attempt to create a critical political environment for FIDESZ, and increase 
the pressure on both Hungary and EPP’s leadership. Both Engel and De Lange’s 
comments are steeped in an ideological and political critique of FIDESZ’s role in 
Hungary and in Europe. Engel’s statement is more of a structural social pressure within 
the EPP to hold FIDESZ accountable, while De Lange’s comment brings into question 
the entire ideological paradigm of European politics. In conjunction, the statements 
situate FIDESZ in an ideological crisis of European politics, with EPP as FIDESZ’s 
moderator in the EU. Engel and De Lange’s statements encapsulate the ideological nature 
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of social pressure, as well as the depth and breadth of critique that can be implicated with 
social pressure.  
While the frustration from the EPP delegates indicates a massive political and 
ideological rift between Hungary and the EU, the EPP has also attempted to exert social 
pressure on Hungary on specific issues. During FIDESZ’s 2017 attack on civil society 
and the Central European University, party chairman Joseph Daul stated, “EPP asked 
FIDESZ and the Hungarian authorities to take all necessary steps to comply with the 
Commission’s request. Prime Minister Orban has reassured the EPP that Hungary will act 
accordingly” (news). Daul accompanied his statement with the assertion that the EPP will 
not condone the violation of the rule of law or the closing of the CEU. Daul’s statement 
represents an attempt to establish accountability with social pressure. However, Daul’s 
announcement was met with retaliative statements from Orban, who undermined the 
seriousness of the EPP’s pressure with facetious comments, such as “They told me to 
behave” (Zalan 2017) in regards to the critique. Furthermore, attempts at social pressure 
were weakened by EPP leader Manfred Weber, who tweeted congratulations to Orban 
after his re-election as chairman of FIDESZ (Zalan 2017). It is important to note that 
while EPP leadership and members mentioned consequences in vague terms, none 
threatened expulsion from the party or sanctions.  
 Although social pressure from Members of European Parliament did not yield any 
behavior correction, and actually incited retaliatory statements, there was one instance 
that social pressure resulted in change. In 2014, the FIDESZ government proposed an 
internet tax on data traffic that prompted large-scale protests (Thorpe 2017). Domestic 
public outcry and condemnation from the Commission, with a particularly harsh 
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statement from Commission Vice President for Digital Agenda Neelie Kroes, both 
occurred within a short window of a few days of the proposal (EURACTIVE 2014). 
Together, the social pressure from above and below resulted in Orban’s cancellation of 
the tax plan (Thorpe 2017). This case may imply the necessity of domestic pressure for 
EU social pressure to succeed.  
 The low effectiveness of economic and social pressure indicates a similar impact 
to hard pressure on illiberal activity in Hungary. However, the various types of soft 
pressure allow for increased flexibility and choice when European authorities attempt to 
correct behavior. From the series of interactions between the EU and the FIDESZ 
government, correction occurred mostly when the policy in question was of low 
ideological value. More technical laws distant from FIDESZ’s nationalist core-- such as 
the Judge Retirement Law, Media Reform, Central Bank Law, and the internet tax 
proposal-- are open to amendment. The next section will further analyze what factors 
make hard and soft pressure less likely to yield positive change.  
Domestic Factors 
 This subsection will outline the domestic factors that contribute to Hungary’s 
escalating resistance to EU post-accession leverage. By discussing domestic conditions as 
significant determinants of behavior modification during post-accession leverage, I am 
arguing that EU pressures on Member States can only be effective to a certain extend 
according to the political and economic environment in the Member State. The three 
main domestic factors are FIDESZ political strength in both the domestic and European 
contexts, economic recovery, and the proliferation of nationalist, Eurosceptic rhetoric.  
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 Discussed some in the previous subsection, Hungary’s relationship with the 
European Union via the European People’s Party (EPP) has complicated implications for 
accountability and implementation of leverage. The EPP leadership failed to sanction or 
expel FIDESZ from its ranks. As seen in the 2017 EPP meeting in which members 
debated the inclusion and behavior of FIDESZ, internal party pressure and criticism still 
did not yield a political or judicial consequence for Orban or FIDESZ. The conflict 
within the EPP demonstrated in the 2017 assembly also aligns with the argument that 
internal party disagreements and politicalization of penalty processes hinders post-
accession leverage. 
 Considering FIDESZ’s electoral results on multiple levels is significant for 
evaluating the party’s weight in the EPP a well as its domestic political strength. Below is 
a table demonstrating FIDEZ’s electoral results in both domestic and European 
parliamentary elections, with the liberal democracy V-DEM score to track the patterns of 
illiberalism. 
FIDESZ Electoral Strength 
Year Domestic Election European Election V-DEM score 
2004 N/A FIDESZ takes 12 out of 
24 Hungarian seats 
0.72 
2006 FIDESZ wins 42% of 
votes, 164 seats 
N/A 0.69 
2009 N/A FIDESZ takes 14 out of 
22 Hungarian seats 
0.71 
2010 FIDESZ wins 53% of 
votes, 262 seats  
N/A 0.64 
2014 FIDESZ wins 44% of 
votes, 133 seats 
FIDESZ takes 12 out of 
21 Hungarian seats 
0.59 
Table 3 
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 While FIDESZ has been a high-vote earning party since 2004, its political power 
came into force in 2010 when it won a two-thirds supermajority. It is important to note 
that one of FIDESZ’s changes to the election process included an amendment to the total 
number of seats in the parliament, with a sharp decrease from 386 to just 199 in 2014 
(Mudde 2014). Therefore, the 133 seats won in 2014 still results in a constitutional 
supermajority.  
 While FIDESZ maintains the majority of Hungarian delegates to the European 
Parliament, FIDESZ membership takes on additional meaning in the context of the EPP’s 
own political strength. In 2004, the EPP had 68 more parliamentary seats than its closest 
rival, the Social Democrats. In 2009, the EPP had 81 more seats than the Social 
Democrats. However, the EPP’s gap narrowed in 2014 to only 23 seats more than the 
Social Democrats. As FIDESZ gained political control in Hungary, the EPP was losing 
its hold on the European Parliament, which could have potentially increased FIDESZ’s 
relative importance to the EPP’s political strategy. FIDESZ’s embeddedness in 
Hungarian politics in conjunction with the EPP’s increased need for parliamentary seats 
contributed to Hungary’s lack of change under pressure.  
 While Hungary’s economy experienced an overall pattern of recovery, there was 
one year in which the Hungarian economy took a downward turn: in 2012, Hungary’s 
annual percent GDP growth was -1.6, while the unemployment rate was at 11% 
(Eurostat). In that same year, FIDESZ bent to EU pressure and amended its criticized 
Central Bank Law. While Orban later backpedaled in the aid talks, the economic nature 
of the exchange during a particularly economically vulnerable year demonstrates the 
connection between domestic factors and the efficacy of EU pressure.  
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 FIDESZ’s far-right nationalist, Eurosceptic rhetoric plays a significant role in 
Hungary’s resistance to EU hard and soft pressures. The previous section discussed how 
FIDESZ is more likely to make an amendment to a policy without strong ideological 
substance or importance to the party’s nationalist outlook. Additionally, the responses to 
highly ideological social pressure, as in the cases of the 2017 Article 7 threat and EPP 
critique of Orban, illustrate how social pressure with a basis in explicit liberal democratic 
values can incite retaliative speech and continued resistance.  
 Retaliative discourse is not the only source of nationalist, Eurosceptic rhetoric; 
illiberal rhetoric is produced by the FIDESZ regime to undermine European Union 
authority. In a 2014 speech, Orban famously declared his agenda to build an illiberal 
democracy (Mahony 2014). Orban argued that Western liberal democracies cannot 
remain globally relevant or competitive, citing the 2008 financial crisis and the rise of 
countries like Russia, China, and Turkey (ibid). Notably, Orban made two points that 
struck at the core of the EU’s ideological and judicial authority: “This means that we 
must break away with the liberal principles of society, the methods and the liberal 
understanding of society at all,” and later he said, “I don’t think that our European Union 
membership precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national 
foundations” (Orban 2014). By claiming the ability to create an illiberal Hungarian 
nation-state inside the EU, Orban is undermining the political value of EU membership, 
as well as the enforceability of EU laws and directives. In the context of Hungary’s 
illiberal activity and the EU’s attempted corrections, the speech takes place just at the 
beginning of the refugee crisis in 2014, which also marks the point in time in which the 
FIDESZ government begins to escalate its neglect of EU corrective pressures. Orban’s 
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speech, as well as the instances of retaliative statements from other FIDESZ officials, 
illustrates the impact of illiberal nationalist rhetoric on the post-accession leverage 
process.  
 Throughout the seven years since FIDESZ’s first supermajority, the party has 
essentially altered the fabric of the Hungarian state and critically undermined the quality 
of democracy. The escalation in FIDESZ’s disregard of European Union values, laws, 
and post-accession pressures reflects the consolidation of FIDESZ’s power in Hungary, 
as well as the proliferation of anti-EU rhetoric. The domestic factors of political strength, 
economic recovery, and illiberal rhetoric create political and economic conditions that 
make FIDESZ less likely to yield to EU pressures.  
Poland 
 This section on Poland will analyze the illiberal activity since its entry into the EU 
in 2004, although the bulk of illiberalism has taken place in recent years, and the 
respective mechanisms of post-accession leverage enacted by the European Union. First, 
I will provide a brief overview of Poland’s history with illiberalism. Then, I will track the 
illiberal activity in Poland, with a focus on the Freedom and Justice Party (PiS) as the 
main actor. In the following subsections, I will discuss the interactions between Poland 
and the EU’s various post-accession leverage mechanisms, with a particular focus on the 
triggering of Article 7 that took place in late 2017. Lastly, I will analyze the domestic 
political and economic factors in Poland that impacted the EU’s post-accession influence. 
The purpose of this section is to outline Poland’s illiberal activity defined by PiS and 
compare the cases of Hungary and Poland through the enactment of Article 7. 
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         Historical context is integral to understanding the rise of illiberalism in Poland. 
The construction of a Catholic Polish nation is at the foundation of the PiS government’s 
conservative nationalist perspective. While the vast majority of Poles are Catholic due to 
the massive cleansing of Jewish Poles in the Holocaust, the Catholic identity has been 
entwined into Poland’s political narrative. Catholicism under Soviet rule and Pope John 
Paul II 1979 homecoming were important factors to driving the Solidarity movement, 
which ultimately negotiated the first free elections in 1989. During his historic visit, Pope 
John Paul II proclaimed that “without Christ it is impossible to understand the history of 
Poland” (Porter 2001 ). While the Pope’s statement clearly speaks to a theological 
perspective of history, it also encapsulates the importance of Catholicism to the Polish 
national identity. In the context of the current illiberalism, the conceptualization of 
Poland as a distinctive Catholic nation is essential to understanding the policies based in 
religious conservativism, focus on the family as a national unit, and the religious-
nationalist arguments against the acceptance of refugees.  
         The Freedom and Justice Party (PiS) is a far-right nationalist party lead by 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski. PiS has been in power twice: once between 2005 and 2007, and 
again in 2015. When PiS first governed in 2005, it upheld the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty and guided Poland into the initial years of EU membership; meanwhile, the PiS 
government engaged with the EU to obtain more voting power (Pawlak 2016). With an 
electoral upset in 2015, PiS has now a governing majority in parliament and the 
presidency. 
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Illiberal Activity 
 This section will identify the significant violations of liberal democracy in Poland 
by PiS, with a focus on the attacks against the Constitutional Court, freedom of the press, 
and entrenchment of PiS policy in Polish law. The bulk of illiberal behavior will have 
taken place since 2015. 
A major aspect of illiberal activity in Poland is PiS’s legislation against the 
judiciary. Unlike FIDESZ, PiS did not ratify an entirely new constitution upon coming 
into the majority. However, the PiS legislation similarly undermines the independence of 
the judiciary and the normative configuration of the state. Between 2015 and 2017, PiS 
launched a series of reforms, including new requirements for Constitutional Court 
rulings. A 2015 law required the Constitutional Court to make decisions on the basis of a 
two-thirds majority, instead of the former simple majority, as well as the presence of 
thirteen judges, instead of the previous nine (The Guardian 2015). The PiS government 
also installed five of its own judges on the fifteen-member Constitutional Court, while 
refusing the validity of appointments made by the Civic Platform government (The 
Guardian 2015). The court-packing and restrictions on the Constitutional Court sharply 
restrict the judiciary’s check on PiS power in both houses of the legislature and the 
presidency. Legislation against the judiciary resurged in early 2017 with a series of bills. 
One of the laws allowed the justice minister to immediately fire and replace any Supreme 
Court justice, and another allowed the justice minister to name all the heads of the lower 
courts (Davies 2017 ). In this case, President Duda, also a member of PiS, vetoed all the 
laws but one: the widening of the justice minister’s ability to appoint lower court heads. 
Later in 2017, another set of bills were introduced to purge all judges not appointed by 
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PiS from the courts, effectively giving PiS full control over the judiciary (Lyman 2017). 
The undermining of the judiciary by PiS demonstrates the government’s structural, 
systemic approach to consolidation of power and disregard for institutional 
independence. 
In addition to illiberal judicial reform, PiS also passed restrictive media legislation 
throughout its majority reign. In 2015, PiS passed a law reconfiguring management of 
public television and radio, handing supervisory and appointment power to PiS 
authorities (Rettman 2015 ). In 2016, PiS released a ban on journalists’ access to 
legislators (Al-Jazeera 2016 ). The restriction of media freedom actively violates liberal 
democratic values, as well as creates a political environment with weakened mechanisms 
of domestic accountability. In the case of the 2016 media ban, parliament lifted the ban in 
response to public outcry, but still made no move to reinstate any greater degree of press 
freedom (Goettig 2016). Crackdown on media access, as well as the consolidation of 
public press management, demonstrates both a disregard for protected liberties and a 
direct attempt to reduce oppositional spaces within the media. 
PiS have not just undermined the freedom of the judiciary and the press, but it has 
also asserted its ethnic nationalist ideology into official political discourse. Like FIDESZ, 
PiS has refused to accept asylum seekers. In 2015, just before the PiS electoral victory, 
party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski made comments claiming refugees were a public health 
risk, a factor to the spread of disease (Reuters 2015). Later, after PiS assumed power, the 
PiS European affairs minister stated that Poland would only accept refugees on the 
condition of certain security measures, associating asylum seekers with terrorist threats 
(Reuters 2014). The 2015 comments later escalated to full reversal of Poland’s 
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commitment to the EU quota resettlement plan, with then-Prime Minister Szydlo 
claiming that there had been no formal agreement made between the EU and the former 
government (Dearden 2017). The anti-refugee rhetoric transformed into defining state 
policy as PiS took power. The PiS stance against refugees reflects the ethnic nationalist 
underpinnings of their party ideology, as well as the party’s disregard for EU agreements. 
The pattern of illiberal activity in Poland under PiS governmental control 
indicates a lack of escalation, meaning an immediate use of state power to consolidate 
rule and undermine institutional freedoms. Unlike FIDESZ, which enacted legislative and 
rhetorical attacks on a wide variety of freedoms, illiberal activity under PiS was swift and 
concentrated on the judiciary and the media. Moreover, FIDESZ enacted much more 
deeply structural reform essential to the configuration of the government, with changes to 
the electoral system and even the decision-making processes within parliament. The 
timeframe of PiS illiberal activity was also much more compact than in Hungary; 
FIDESZ was implementing illiberal policies since 2010, whereas PiS only came into 
power in 2015. The illiberal behavior in Poland by PiS demonstrates the immediacy of 
authoritarian policies and rhetoric upon electoral victory. 
EU Pressures in Poland 
          This section will discuss both the hard and soft pressures enacted by the 
EU in attempt to alter the illiberal behavior. The most significant case of EU post-
accession pressure in Poland is the 2017 triggering of Article 7 for the transgressions 
against rule of law and liberal democracy made by the Freedom and Justice Party. The 
purpose of this section is to illustrate how EU post-accession influence in Poland mainly 
40 
 
took the form of multiple infringement procedures, with the social pressure being 
facilitated by the massive domestic protests. 
         Protests within Poland, joined by solidarity actions elsewhere in Europe, yielded 
the only three instances of the PiS government modifying their illiberal behavior. While 
protests are not instances of EU soft pressure, they may provide a platform for statements 
of solidarity by introducing social opposition to the discourse surrounding the legislation. 
The table below outlines the instances of domestic protests and their efficacy. 
Domestic Protests in Poland 
Event Protest Activity Outcome 
Constitutional Court reform 
(2015) 
Tens of thousands march in 
Warsaw against PiS 
No change 
Abortion ban and 
criminalization (2016) 
Thousands of women strike 
in a nationwide 
demonstration for abortion 
rights 
Parliament backs of 
criminalization law 
Surveillance Law (2016) Thousands march in 
Warsaw to protest against 
increase in government’s 
surveillance powers 
No change 
Media Ban (2016) Immediate protests of 
thousands inside and 
outside parliament building 
Parliament lifts ban 
Series of bills on the 
authority of justice minister 
(2017) 
Protests in Warsaw at 
Presidential Palace 
President vetoes two out of 
three laws 
Table 4  
         As seen in the table, domestic protests had some effectiveness in pressuring the 
PiS government into behavior correction. In the cases of the Abortion Ban, Media Ban, 
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and 2017 judiciary laws, either the parliament or the president responded with total 
correction (i.e. completely removing the law) or partial correction, as seen in the 
president’s vetoes. It is important to note that during this time period, Poland was 
simultaneously under investigation or engaged in infringement proceedings regarding the 
rule of law and freedom of the press.   
         During instances of domestic protest, European authorities spoke out against PiS 
policies. For example, Guy Verhofstadt, Belgian politician and President of the Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, released statements via Twitter in solidarity with 
the Abortion Ban protests (Lindrea 2016). Terry Reintke, a German Member of European 
Parliament, also stated her support of the protesters against the Abortion Ban (Lindrea 
2016). During the 2017 protests against the series of judiciary laws, European Union 
officials, including Vice President of European Commission Frans Timmermans, made 
statements regarding the laws’ threat to liberal democracy (Boffey, Davies 2017). The 
statements exemplify how the protests created a platform in public discourse for 
European officials and politicians to exert additional social pressure on the PiS 
government. The protests and solidarity statements from EU authorities represented a 
compounded kind of social pressure from both above and below on the PiS government. 
         Soft pressure also includes economic leverage. Unlike the Hungary case, there 
was not the leveraging of financial aid. However, there was an instance in 2017 when the 
Cohesion Fund for Poland was indirectly threatened by a proposal to freeze funds to rule-
breaking Member States (Eder 2017). Additionally, in 2017, European Commissioner for 
Justice Vera Jourova proposed that distribution of EU funds should be contingent on the 
Member States’ adherence to EU principles (Becker 2017). In response to the potential 
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for a punitive cut in funding, the PiS government dismissed the threat; Prime Minister 
Szydlo claimed that the threat was empty because the proposal violated EU legality 
(Kelly and Goettig 2017). The proposals of EU funding reform based on Member State 
behavior is not just an instance of soft pressure, but an example of how the EU is 
systematically responding to illiberalism in Member States. As the Commission 
experiments with proposals to reconfigure the funding process, the grant funding to 
Poland experienced a sharp increase as the illiberal activity increased. In 2014, before the 
PiS victory, Poland received around twenty-nine million Euros. In 2015, when PiS took 
power and began illiberal behavior, grant funding increased to nearly two hundred-and-
eighty million Euros. The 2017 grant funding peaked at just over seven-hundred million 
Euros. The increase in funding with the increase in illiberal activity is a pattern also seen 
in the Hungary case, reinforcing the concept of additive economic pressure to influence 
Member State behavior. 
The rest of the section will discuss hard pressure, with a particular focus on the 
triggering of Article 7. Since the PiS came into power in 2015, the European Commission 
has launched multiple infringement procedures against Poland on the issues of rule of 
law, violations against the judiciary, refusal to accept refugees, and the undermining of 
press freedom. However, there is not a single instance in which the PiS government 
reacted to an infringement procedure with any behavior modification. In response, the 
European Commission has used unprecedented measures in attempt to cease illiberal 
activity and democratic backsliding: the rule of law framework, and Article 7. 
         The rule of law framework is a recently established mechanism designed to 
address systemic threats in Member States during a time of crisis (European Commission 
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2014). The rule of law framework is meant to deescalate a Member State’s transgressions 
before the need to trigger Article 7. The mechanism’s process is similar to the 
infringement procedure; it involves an assessment of the Member State’s activity and a 
Commission recommendation. However, if the Member State does not adhere to the 
recommendation, the Commission will directly trigger Article 7. The rule of law 
framework was enacted against Poland in July 2017. In November of 2017, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution calling for Article 7 against Poland (Bodalsk 2017). By 
December 2017, the Commission brought forth Article 7(1), the first step in suspending 
membership rights, including voting rights. The quick succession of hard pressure 
punitive measures indicates both the Polish government’s continuance of illiberal activity 
and the government’s refusal to engage in dialogue. In the Commission’s announcement 
of the Article 7 proceedings, the preference for deescalated dialogue is clear: “Whilst 
taking these unprecedented measures, the Commission maintains its offer for a 
constructive dialogue to remedy the current situation” (European Commission 2017). The 
PiS government’s continued neglect of EU standards, recommendations, and directives 
despite the use of unprecedented mechanisms undermine the institutional gravitas of such 
procedures. 
         Unlike Hungary, the PiS government did not demonstrate any trace of 
engagement with the EU’s attempts at correction. The EU’s swift implementation of hard 
pressure on the PiS government did not result in any acknowledgement or behavior 
modification. Illiberal behavior was impacted mostly by domestic social pressure in the 
form of protests, without EU authorities acting as the central source of soft pressure. As 
in the Hungary case, the few instances of the PiS government correcting behavior 
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pertained to laws that did not have great ideological significance to the party or complete 
party support. The PiS government’s meager responses to social pressure and total lack of 
response to hard pressure represent a stark political reality in which the mechanisms 
multilevel governance within the European Union fail to enact change.  
Domestic Factors 
In this section, I will outline domestic factors that contribute to the PiS 
government’s disregard of EU pressures despite the escalating severity of EU hard 
pressure mechanisms. Domestic factors include PiS electoral strength in Polish and EU 
races, the shifting economic needs of the electorate, and the rhetoric of Polish nationalism 
and sovereignty. In regards to the contextual relationship between Poland and the EU 
during the development of the PiS government’s illiberalism, it is important to note that 
the European Council president since 2014 has been Donald Tusk, the former Polish 
Prime Minister for the Civic Platform government and political rival to PiS leadership. 
         The PiS party’s electoral history is an unstable one. On a national level, the PiS 
party briefly held power within a coalition government in 2005, just after Poland’s 
accession into the EU, but lost to Civic Platform in 2007. The PiS presidential and 
parliament electoral victories in 2015 were upsets, with PiS suddenly gaining seventy-
eight seats in one election (Election Resources Poland). The PiS electoral history is 
included in the table below: 
PiS Electoral Strength 
Year Domestic Election European Election 
2004 N/A PiS wins 7 out of 54 seats 
for Alliance for Europe of 
the Nations (AEN) 
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2005 PiS wins 27% of votes, 
takes majority 
N/A 
2009 N/A PiS wins 15 out of 50 seats 
for AEN 
2011 PiS wins 29.9% of votes, 
loses majority to Civic 
Platform 
N/A 
2014 N/A PiS wins 19 out of 51 seats 
for European Conservatives 
and Reformists (ECR)* 
2015 PiS wins 37.6% of votes, 
takes majority 
N/A 
Table 5 
*The AEN dissolved in 2009 and PiS affiliation shifted to the ECR. 
         The table illustrates two concurrent patterns of electoral activity for PiS: over 
time, the PiS won an increasing share of votes in both domestic and European elections; 
however, the party’s positionality within its political institutions is shifting in and out of 
prominence. Unlike FIDESZ, PiS does not have an advantageous relationship in the 
European Parliament, particularly because of its change in affiliation from one minority 
party to another minority party. The lack of advantageous partisan ties may also be an 
important factor in making Poland vulnerable to the hard pressure mechanisms EU 
authorities have not exerted against Hungary. 
         The sudden electoral success in 2015 plays a significant role in the pattern of PiS 
behavior described previously in the section. The success of the 2015 election 
domestically emboldened the PiS to enact illiberal policies while ignoring EU attempts at 
constructive engagement. However, unlike FIDESZ, the PiS government did not attack 
the electoral system. While PiS did weaken the judiciary, and therefore the supervisory 
46 
 
check on the PiS government, parliament did not pass laws altering the geographic and 
political structures defining the basis of elections. And while PiS did reconfigure the 
management of public media, it did not specifically legislate on the issue of opposition 
campaigning. Because the PiS did not entrench its majority in law like FIDESZ, PiS 
remained domestically vulnerable despite its electoral success, which is a significant 
context for the instances of behavior correction during protests. 
         The economic environment in Poland is a significant domestic factor for the PiS 
government’s disregard of European Union post-accession pressure. During the 2008 
global financial crisis, Poland was the only economy in the European Union to not go 
into recession (Piatkowski 2015). In recent years, economic indicators have shown 
macro-level trends of overall enhancement. 
         In the graph above, there is a pattern of decreasing unemployment and gradual 
relief of government debt. Especially since 2014 and 2015, there has been a more 
discernable change in the economic indicators. Within the context of macro-level 
economic positive change, the PiS has taken a stance of strong national involvement in 
the economy. The PiS government, unlike previous governments, put forth a 
comprehensive welfare program that involves unconditional monthly cash payments to 
all families with more than one child (Adekoya 2016). The PiS welfare policy was hinged 
on a nationalist rhetoric, as seen in statements from then-candidate Beata Szydlo: “The 
state has abandoned too many people. There are too many divisions. We need to 
eliminate those divisions to ensure everyone feels the state is on their side” (Pawlak, 
Goettig 2015). The welfare program is an example of the PiS uses its economic policy to 
articulate nationalist, family-oriented rhetoric. Other PiS economic policies include 
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statements on government regulation of property rights and banks, as well as lowering the 
retirement age (Politico 2016). In the party’s 2014 plan, there was a strong connection 
between the economy, sovereignty, and the family unit: “A sovereign state… where 
Polish families can continue and develop… [A sovereign state] is possible if we develop 
as a nation… as a community of Polish families” (PiS). While the macro-level economic 
indicators suggest a larger narrative of success, the PiS populist economics center the 
Polish family as a symbol of nationalist values to protect. The shift from the pro-EU, pro-
free market Civic Platform government to the nationalist populist PiS government 
indicates a marked prioritization of nationalist economics. Poland’s economic strength in 
conjunction with the PiS government’s populist policies and nationalist framing 
ultimately devalues the EU’s market-sourced authority, situating the EU as an implicit 
threat to the Polish family. 
         PiS nationalist rhetoric in all sectors is a significant domestic contributor to the 
lack of behavior correction throughout the EU’s implementation of hard and soft 
pressure. Polish sovereignty and exceptionalism within the European Union is at the 
center of PiS rhetoric designed to diminish the EU’s political and ideological significance 
in Poland. After Brexit, Prime Minister Szydlo and PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski made 
statements about the “non-consensual” nature of EU decision-making and Poland’s focus 
on the protection of “sovereignty” within the EU (Pawlak 2016). In reference to the 
refugee resettlement quota system, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who replaced 
Szydlo in 2017, stated “We will not accept refugees, migrants from the Middle East and 
Africa. This is our sovereign decision” (Kelly, Pawlak, 2018). Sovereignty is also 
invoked in PiS party materials, as seen in the discussion of PiS nationalist economic 
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rhetoric. In the party materials, a sovereign state is framed as an aspirational vision of 
Poland, with realization of that dream contingent on a centering of the Polish nation and 
Polish families in politics. While approximately eighty percent of Poles support EU 
membership (Pawlak 2016), PiS rhetoric is integrating a version of Polish separatism 
within the framework of EU membership rooted in the invocation of sovereignty. 
         PiS domestic electoral victory, economic success, nationalist populist economic 
policies, and significance of Polish sovereignty in PiS rhetoric create a political-economic 
environment in which the EU’s authority and liberal social policies are sharply devalued. 
The PiS government’s complete failure to constructively engage in dialogue with the EU 
regarding policy correction is not simply a reflection of escalating illiberalism, but also 
an indicator of diminishing multilevel governance. 
Analysis 
 This section will analyze the two case countries in the framework of the 
hypotheses. The purpose of this section is to emphasize the role of the Member State’s 
domestic political and economic environment as a moderator of the EU’s post-accession 
influence.  
 The first hypothesis pertains to the role of domestic political and economic health 
in the EU’s ability to exert change in misbehaving Member States. H1: If the EU is 
exerting both judicial and economic pressures, illiberal behavior can only be corrected if 
the Member State is economically vulnerable or if the incumbent government is 
politically vulnerable. In both the Hungary and Poland cases, the illiberal governments 
were resistant to behavior modification. In Poland and Hungary, economic strength and 
recovery made the illiberal governments less likely to alter behavior. Even in the example 
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of the EU exerting economic pressure during a time of economic weakness, Hungary’s 
change in policy was superficial and technical. While FIDESZ reduced their political 
vulnerability with electoral and judicial laws, the PiS government’s political vulnerability 
made them liable to alteration during popular protests. Both cases reinforced the assertion 
of H1 that domestic economic strength and  political security make illiberal governments 
less likely to alter their behavior.  
 The second hypothesis relates to the role of the relationship between the illiberal 
government and their affiliated European party on the EU’s ability to hold Member States 
accountable. H2: If the incumbent government’s delegates to the European Parliament 
have strategic value to their party caucus, the EU will not be able to fully exert economic 
and/or social pressures. As seen in the case studies, FIDESZ has a strategic relationship 
with the powerful EPP, while PiS has had shifting affiliations with minority European 
parties. While EPP members demonstrated tension with FIDEZ and Orban’s illiberalism, 
EPP leadership continued to protect FIDESZ and avoid internal party penalties. In 
contrast, the PiS became the subject of the unprecedented judicial measures to influence 
illiberal behavior. While partisan relationships may not have a direct causal impact on 
implementation of EU pressure, the different positionalities and experiences of 
implementation between FIDESZ and PiS endorses the hypothetical idea that 
parliamentary relations influences the extent of EU corrective mechanisms. 
 The third hypothesis pertains to the ideological nature of social pressure and is 
broken down into two parts. H3.A: When the EU exerts post-accession pressure, if it 
includes ideology-based social pressure, determined illiberal governments will not 
modify their behavior. In both cases, ideologically-based social pressure did not yield 
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behavior changes. It is also important to note that any behavior modification by illiberal 
governments was made under multiple forms of pressure, not social pressure alone. 
H3.B: The more the EU utilizes ideology=based social pressure, the more likely the 
Member States’ incumbent illiberal government will be to resist the EU. According to the 
third hypothesis, ideology-based social pressure is not only ineffective; it incites further 
resistance and retaliative rhetoric. Retaliative rhetoric is particularly clear in the Hungary 
case, where criticisms couched in liberal terms were met with defiant statements from 
FIDESZ officials. However, PiS governments did not engage with retaliative rhetoric. 
While the Hungary case supports the hypothesis, the Poland case illustrates an exception 
to the issue of social pressure and retaliative rhetoric; the PiS failed to engage with the 
EU in any substantive dialogue.  
 Together, the cases of Hungary and Poland demonstrate the importance of 
domestic political and economic factors in moderating the EU’s influence. Analysis of 
FIDESZ and PiS also exhibits the increasingly relevant role of Eurosceptic rhetoric in the 
discrediation of EU authority. Not only is hard pressure limited, the proliferation of 
nationalist Eurosceptic rhetoric limits soft pressure as well. Rhetoric deployed by 
FIDESZ and PiS uses sovereignty and nationalism to question the EU’s right to define 
and enforce liberal values. By framing relations with the EU as a struggle of sovereignty, 
the illiberal governments invalidate the ideological underpinnings of the EU’s 
infringements and criticisms.  
Conclusion 
 This paper has argued that domestic factors, such as political security of the 
illiberal actor, advantageous relationships within the European Parliament, economic 
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strength, and proliferation of nationalist Eurosceptic rhetoric modulate the efficacy of the 
European Union’s mechanisms of post-accession leverage. This paper placed emphasis 
on illiberal rhetoric’s role in discrediting post-accession leverage and the EU’s authority. 
 At the crux of this research is the crisis of the European Union’s ideological 
leadership. As more Member States fall to illiberalism, the European Union must adapt 
their post-accession leverage mechanisms to the new demands of preventing democratic 
backsliding. Today, anti-EU sentiment and illiberalism is threatening democracies in 
Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania. To cope with the rise in 
illiberalism among Member States, the European Union should question the carrot-stick 
paradigm underlying its post-accession leverage mechanisms and the politicization of 
enforcement measures by decision-makers.  
 One of the limitations of this study is the close proximity to unprecedented events, 
such as the triggering of Article 7 against Poland. Future studies will be able to analyze 
the impacts of Article 7 on the EU’s relationships with all illiberal governments. It is 
necessary to study illiberal democracy in the European Union in order to understand the 
ways in which misbehaving Member States threaten the ideological and judicial 
structures of the EU.  
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